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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.  
 This appeal arises out of a federal investigation into a 
heroin distribution ring that operated out of a Scranton hip-
hop radio station and recording studio called Hood Promo. 
Eight individuals associated with the hip-hop heroin hub were 
indicted on various federal drug and weapons charges. All of 
them pleaded guilty except for Appellant Terrell Stevenson.  
 Before Stevenson was brought to trial, the Defendants 
filed dozens of pretrial motions. Although most of the delay 
occasioned by the various motions and plea negotiations was 
“excludable time” under federal law, the Government 
conceded that Stevenson’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act 
were nevertheless violated. Accordingly, Stevenson filed a 
motion to dismiss his indictment, which the District Court 
granted without prejudice to the Government’s right to indict 
him anew on the same charges.  Stevenson’s principal 
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claim in this appeal is that the District Court abused its 
discretion when it granted his motion to dismiss without 
prejudice. He also argues that the indictment failed to allege 
all the elements of the crime of fraud in relation to 
identification documents. In addition, he appeals the District 
Court’s denial of his motions to suppress, the propriety of the 
District Court’s conduct at trial, and the reasonableness of his 
360-month sentence.   
I 
A 
 In December 2011, at the request of the Lackawanna 
County Drug Task Force, federal agents became involved in 
the search for an elusive heroin dealer named Siquana 
Wallace. Using a variety of investigatory methods, including 
confidential sources, physical surveillance, undercover 
purchases, body wires, and a pole camera, the agents 
concluded that Hood Promo was the Scranton hub of a heroin 
ring. The owner of Hood Promo—Lamar Thomas a.k.a. 
“Hood”—and another man—Greg Bush a.k.a. “G”—were 
suspected of transporting heroin from New York to Scranton 
and then distributing the drugs out of Hood Promo. One 
member of the drug trafficking organization was a 5’6” black 
male in his late twenties known as “Inf” or “Infinite,” who 
drove a gray BMW. In addition to concluding that “Inf” dealt 
heroin in nearby Wilkes-Barre, the agents learned that “Inf” 
was wanted in New York for drug-related crimes and that his 
real name was Terrell Stevenson.  
 While conducting surveillance outside Hood Promo on 
February 15, 2012, DEA Special Agent William Davis 
observed a black male arrive at the studio in a gray 2004 
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BMW, enter and exit the building, and begin driving in the 
direction of Wilkes-Barre. His “investigative instinct” roused, 
Davis ran the vehicle’s registration and arranged for the local 
police to conduct a traffic stop after he learned the car was 
registered to Lamar Thomas. App. 962. The driver of the 
car—who agents later learned was Appellant Stevenson—
produced a Georgia driver’s license bearing the name Nathan 
Ernest Truitt. The police accordingly sent “Truitt” on his way.  
 Stevenson did not escape the DEA’s grasp for long. 
Court-authorized wiretaps of Thomas’s and Bush’s phones 
and further investigation into Hood Promo led the authorities 
to home in on several suspects, including Stevenson. On May 
22, 2012, Special Agent Davis submitted an affidavit in 
support of a search warrant application for five properties, 
one of which was Stevenson’s residence. A magistrate judge 
issued the warrant and the DEA executed it, arresting 
Stevenson and his roommate Chris Taylor, and seizing 
hundreds of glassine baggies of heroin, a loaded handgun 
(found in Stevenson’s room and later confirmed to be stolen), 
fraudulent driver’s licenses and credit cards in the names of 
Gregory Matthew Henderson and Nathan Ernest Truitt (found 
on Stevenson’s person), and various other inculpatory items 
and documents. In all, eight individuals were arrested around 
the same time in connection with the Hood Promo 
conspiracy.  
B 
 The number of Defendants and the complexity of the 
case resulted in a lengthy and sometimes hectic pretrial 
process. On June 5, 2012, a federal grand jury returned an 
indictment against seven defendants, including Stevenson, 
who was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess 
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with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin within 
1,000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 
841; unlawful use of a communication facility (i.e., using a 
cellphone in furtherance of his illegal activity) in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 843(b); and unlawful possession of a stolen 
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). Because Stevenson 
refused to enter a plea at his June 13, 2012 arraignment, the 
District Court entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf and 
scheduled trial for August 20, 2012, setting July 16 as the 
deadline for filing pretrial motions. When that date arrived, 
Stevenson filed his first of eight unopposed motions to extend 
the pretrial motions deadline, all of which were granted by the 
District Court. The cycle repeated when a federal grand jury 
returned a superseding indictment on October 16, 2012, 
which was identical to the original indictment, except that it 
added an eighth defendant. The Court once again entered a 
plea of not guilty for Stevenson after he refused to enter a 
plea.  
 The next year involved a steady stream of pretrial 
motions and extension requests from the Defendants. Among 
them was a motion by Stevenson to suppress evidence seized 
from his residence for lack of probable cause to support the 
search warrant, which the District Court denied on October 
25, 2013. From that day until February 7, 2014, the 70-day 
Speedy Trial Act clock was running (except for one 
excludable day). See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h). Seizing on 
this inappropriate delay, Stevenson filed a motion to dismiss 
on June 16, 2014. After the Government conceded that at 
least 103 non-excludable days had passed since Stevenson’s 
arraignment, the District Court agreed with Stevenson that the 
Speedy Trial Act required dismissal of the first superseding 
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indictment.1 Unfortunately for Stevenson, the Court did not 
agree with his request to dismiss the indictment with 
prejudice.  
 Guided by three factors the Speedy Trial Act requires 
trial courts to consider, see 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), the 
District Court held that dismissal without prejudice was 
appropriate. The Court concluded that the first factor—the 
seriousness of the offense—weighed against dismissal with 
prejudice because courts have consistently agreed that drug 
trafficking and firearm offenses are serious. It also decided 
that the second factor—the facts and circumstances that led to 
the Speedy Trial Act violation—militated against dismissal 
with prejudice. In the District Court’s view, the non-
excludable delay was relatively harmless “in light of the 
repeated delays and the chaotic nature” of the case—much of 
                                              
1 During the pendency of Stevenson’s motion, the 
Government obtained a second superseding indictment 
against Stevenson which reasserted the same charges as the 
first one and added counts for possession with intent to 
distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug 
trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of a firearm by a fugitive 
from justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2). Applying 
out-of-circuit precedent holding that the speedy trial period 
does not reset when stale charges are strategically reasserted 
in a superseding indictment, the Court ruled that the 
Government’s second superseding indictment did not remedy 
the violation with respect to the three original counts of the 
first superseding indictment.  
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which was attributable to the acts of the eight Defendants. 
App. 43. Finally, the Court viewed the third factor—the 
impact of a new prosecution on the administration of 
justice—as supporting dismissal without prejudice because 
Stevenson did not show that he was prejudiced by the 
Government’s violation of the statute. For these reasons, the 
Court dismissed the charges against Stevenson contained in 
the first superseding indictment without prejudice on 
September 4, 2014.  
 The Government obtained a third superseding 
indictment against Stevenson on September 9, 2014. The 
charges in that indictment were the same as the one that 
preceded it, except for a new count of fraud in relation to 
identification documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028(a)(7). Stevenson promptly moved to dismiss this new 
charge on the basis that the indictment failed to allege the 
interstate-commerce element of the offense, but the District 
Court found the indictment sufficient and denied the motion. 
In anticipation of defending against this charge, Stevenson 
moved to suppress evidence relating to the stop of his vehicle 
and his production of false identification. The Court denied 
the motion prior to trial, finding that Stevenson had provided 
no evidence to support his contention of an unlawful stop, but 
allowed Stevenson to re-argue the motion, ultimately 
concluding that the stop was supported by reasonable 
suspicion that “Inf” was the driver and that criminal activity 
was afoot.  
 After a one-week trial, the jury found Stevenson guilty 
on all counts except one: possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of drug trafficking. The Court sentenced 
Stevenson to 360 months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy-
to-distribute and possession-with-intent-to-distribute counts, 
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96 months on the communications-facility count, 120 months 
on each of the firearms-related counts, and 240 months on the 
fraud count—all to run concurrently. Stevenson appealed.2  
II 
 Although Stevenson raises several challenges to his 
conviction and sentence, his principal argument is that the 
District Court abused its discretion when it dismissed the first 
superseding indictment without prejudice. He also takes issue 
with the adequacy of the facts alleged in the indictment to 
support the identification-document fraud charge, the District 
Court’s refusal to suppress evidence gathered from the stop of 
his vehicle and the search of his residence, the propriety of 
the District Court’s conduct during trial, and the 
reasonableness of his sentence. We address each argument in 
turn. 
A 
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” 
U.S. Const. amend. VI. To vindicate this right, Congress 
established a bright-line rule in the Speedy Trial Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174, which requires that a trial start “within 
seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the 
information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has 
appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such 
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. 
                                              
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231 and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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§ 3161(c)(1). This deadline is not absolute, however, because 
certain periods of delay “shall be excluded . . . in computing 
the time within which the trial . . . must commence.” 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h). The most common form of “excludable” 
delay results from the filing and disposition of pretrial 
motions. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).  
 If a defendant is not brought to trial within the 
requisite time, the Speedy Trial Act mandates dismissal of the 
indictment upon the defendant’s motion. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3162(a)(2). As for whether the dismissal should be with or 
without prejudice, the Act requires the court to “consider, 
among others, each of the following factors: [1] the 
seriousness of the offense; [2] the facts and circumstances of 
the case which led to the dismissal; and [3] the impact of a 
reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the 
administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The 
Supreme Court has explained that the “district court must 
carefully consider th[ese] factors as applied to the particular 
case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect 
in order to permit meaningful appellate review.” United 
States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336 (1988).3  
                                              
 3 We review the District Court’s dismissal without 
prejudice for abuse of discretion and its underlying factual 
findings for clear error. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 336–37; see also 
United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1092 (10th Cir. 
1993) (“Because ‘Congress has declared that a decision will 
be governed by consideration of particular factors,’ appellate 
review is limited to ascertaining ‘whether a district court has 
ignored or slighted a factor that Congress has deemed 
pertinent to the choice of remedy.’”) (quoting Taylor, 487 
U.S. at 336–37). 
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1 
 We now turn to the question of whether the District 
Court gave appropriate consideration to these factors and 
acted within its discretion in dismissing the first superseding 
indictment without prejudice.4 The first factor is “the 
seriousness of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). This 
element “centers primarily on society’s interest in bringing 
                                              
4 As a threshold matter, the Government now concedes 
that it did not reset the speedy trial clock by obtaining a 
second superseding indictment in response to Stevenson’s 
motion to dismiss. As we have explained, “[w]hen subsequent 
charges are filed in a supplemental indictment that charge the 
same offense as the original indictment or one required to be 
joined therewith . . . the speedy trial period commences with 
the original filing.”  United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 
872 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Hence, the second 
superseding indictment did not rescue the three original 
charges of the first superseding indictment (conspiracy to 
distribute a controlled substance, unlawful use of a 
communication facility, and possession of a stolen firearm). 
On the other hand, “[i]f the subsequent filing charges a new 
offense that did not have to be joined with the original 
charges, then the subsequent filing commences a new, 
independent speedy trial period.” Id. Because none of the new 
charges added in the second superseding indictment were 
required to have been joined with the three original charges, 
the District Court was correct in dismissing only those three 
counts. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932) (holding that offenses requiring proof of different 
elements are distinct and need not be charged together); 
United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1291 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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the particular accused to trial.” United States v. Hastings, 847 
F.2d 920, 925 (1st Cir. 1988). The logic behind this factor is 
intuitive: “[t]he graver the crimes, the greater the insult to 
societal interests if the charges are dropped, once and for all, 
without a meaningful determination of guilt or innocence.” 
Id.  
 Stevenson concedes that the drug and firearm charges 
at issue are serious because “overwhelming precedent 
acknowledg[es] the serious nature of such charges.” 
Stevenson Br. 19. See, e.g., Taylor, 487 U.S. at 328, 338–39 
(“We have no reason to doubt” that “charges of conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and possession of 400 grams of cocaine 
with intent to distribute” are “serious.”); United States v. 
Williams, 314 F.3d 552, 559 (11th Cir. 2002) (conspiracy to 
distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine are 
“extremely serious” offenses under the Speedy Trial Act 
whose seriousness is compounded by possession of a firearm 
during the offenses); United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 
244 (1st Cir. 1985) (charges for distribution and conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine are “undeniably serious” and “militate in 
favor of dismissal without prejudice”); United States v. 
Simmons, 786 F.2d 479, 485 (2d Cir. 1986) (possession of 
heroin with intent to distribute is “serious” within the 
meaning of the Speedy Trial Act); United States v. Moss, 217 
F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2000) (possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute is a serious offense); United States v. 
Wright, 6 F.3d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same). We join our 
sister courts today and hold that Stevenson’s heroin and 
firearms offenses are serious crimes for purposes of the 
Speedy Trial Act. Accordingly, the District Court rightly held 
that the first factor weighed in favor of dismissal without 
prejudice.  
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2 
 The second consideration—the facts and 
circumstances that led to dismissal—also supports the District 
Court’s decision. This factor requires courts to consider the 
reasons for the delay: did it stem from “intentional dilatory 
conduct” or a “pattern of neglect on the part of the 
Government,” or rather, from a relatively benign hitch in the 
prosecutorial process? United States v. Cano-Silva, 402 F.3d 
1031, 1036 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In determining whether the 
facts and circumstances warrant dismissal with prejudice we 
focus on the culpability of the conduct that led to the delay.”); 
see also United States v. Blevins, 142 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 
1998) (“Regarding the facts and circumstances leading to the 
dismissal, we look to whether the Government sought the 
resultant delays for ulterior purposes as well as whether the 
Government’s failure to meet deadlines was repetitive, 
regular, and frequent with respect to this defendant.”).  
 Applying these principles, the District Court 
reasonably concluded that although “the Government 
certainly neglected its duties by failing to bring th[e] case to 
trial” with sufficient dispatch, the circumstances indicated 
that the error was “relatively innocent and harmless.” App. 
43. For instance, there was no evidence that the Government 
had acted in bad faith or to gain some tactical advantage. See 
United States v. Becerra, 435 F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(bad faith or willful misconduct can support dismissal with 
prejudice); United States v. Medina, 524 F.3d 974, 987 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (same); Taylor, 487 U.S. at 339. Nor was there 
reason to believe that the Government had engaged in a 
“pattern of neglect.” Taylor, 487 U.S. at 338–39 (contrasting 
a “truly neglectful attitude” with “isolated unwitting 
violation[s]”); see also United States v. Kottmyer, 961 F.2d 
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569, 572–73 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal without 
prejudice where no “pattern of neglect” or “intentional 
dilatory conduct” had been shown); United States v. Clymer, 
25 F.3d 824, 831–32 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the sheer 
length of the [delay] involved” in a Speedy Trial Act 
violation may significantly impact whether dismissal with 
prejudice is warranted). 
 Stevenson faults the District Court for looking to the 
number of excludable days in addition to the length of the 
non-excludable delay in the course of its analysis, but we 
perceive no error in that regard. In reviewing the events that 
led to the Speedy Trial Act violation, the Court noted that the 
non-excludable days that had elapsed between Stevenson’s 
arraignment and his motion to dismiss were dwarfed by the 
hundreds of days that had been excluded—virtually all due to 
motions made by Stevenson and his codefendants.5 But the 
Court did not examine the number of excludable days as part 
of a balancing exercise. Rather, it did so to inform its 
evaluation of the litigation as a whole and indicated that the 
Government’s impermissible delay was “explainable in light 
of the repeated delays and the chaotic nature of th[e] case, 
which, at its height, included eight coconspirator defendants, 
several of whom were in the process of negotiating plea 
                                              
 5 For instance, 33 of the 34 motions for extensions of 
time and for continuances were filed by Stevenson and his 
codefendants. Such delays were no doubt compounded by 
Stevenson’s initial refusal to admit that he was, in fact, 
Terrell Stevenson in his early appearances before the Court 
(posing instead as “Stevenson’s representative”), as well as 
his peculiar insistence that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction because the case belonged in admiralty court.  
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arrangements at the time that the Speedy Trial violation 
occurred.”6 App. 43–44. Taken together, these facts and 
circumstances support the District Court’s conclusion that the 
second statutory factor also favored dismissal without 
prejudice.7 
                                              
 6 Contrary to Stevenson’s assertion, this assessment 
comported with the Government’s explanation for the non-
excludable delay. Accordingly, his citation to the pre-Taylor 
case, United States v. Russo, for the proposition that “[s]ome 
affirmative justification must be demonstrated to warrant a 
dismissal without prejudice” is inapposite. 741 F.2d 1264, 
1267 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (reversing the district 
court’s decision to dismiss without prejudice where the only 
reason for a several-month delay was the government’s 
negligence). In any event, we view Russo as an outlier and are 
inclined to agree with its dissent. See id. at 1268 (Atkins, J., 
dissenting). In particular, the majority’s terse consideration of 
the Speedy Trial Act factors in that case not only was 
insufficiently deferential to the district court, but also 
superimposed a strong “affirmative justification” requirement 
on the “facts and circumstances” factor—thereby putting a 
thumb on the scale in favor of dismissal with prejudice—that 
is both absent from the text of the statute and inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s subsequent instruction in Taylor 
that a bare assertion that there was “no excuse” for a given 
delay affords inadequate basis for dismissal with prejudice. 
487 U.S. at 339. 
 7 The only Speedy Trial Act violation Stevenson 
alleged in the District Court was the 103-day non-excludable 
period between October 25, 2013, and February 7, 2014. He 
now argues for the first time that the total number of non-
15 
 
3 
 The last statutory factor—the impact of a 
reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act 
and on the administration of justice—also supports the 
Government. “The main considerations that courts have taken 
into account when examining this factor are whether the 
defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of the delay 
and whether the government engaged in prosecutorial 
misconduct that must be deterred to ensure compliance with 
the Act.”8 United States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 562 (6th 
                                                                                                     
excludable days following his arraignment was actually 165 
days. Our review of the docket supports this figure, but the 
District Court was not required to “scour the record to make 
the case of a party who d[id] nothing,” Herman v. City of 
Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1989), and Stevenson 
has not claimed it was improper for the District Court to rely 
on the parties’ stipulation as to the delay. Regardless, the 
District Court opined that “[e]ven if there [were] other 
nonexcludable days that the parties [did not bring] to the 
Court’s attention,” the broader facts and circumstances still 
weighed in favor of dismissal without prejudice in light of the 
defendant-driven deluge of excludable days throughout the 
protracted run-up to trial and the disorder they produced. 
App. 43.  
 8 The Supreme Court has suggested that prejudice to 
the defendant is among the “other[]” non-express factors that 
the Speedy Trial Act directs district courts to consider. See 
Taylor, 487 U.S. at 333–34 (gleaning from the legislative 
history “the relevance of prejudice to the defendant”); id. at 
344 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (arguing that the facts “(1) 
that prejudice to the defendant is one of the factors that the 
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Cir. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see 
also Blevins, 142 F.3d at 226. The District Court concluded 
that this factor weighed in favor of dismissal without 
prejudice, reasoning that it was “very difficult to discern how 
Stevenson could plausibly have been prejudiced by the delay 
that occurred,” that he had offered no evidence of prejudice, 
and that there had been no Government misconduct beyond 
the bare fact of the delay. App. 44. 
 Stevenson counters by arguing that he suffered actual 
prejudice because the delay enabled the Government to reach 
plea agreements with some of his co-defendants and turn 
them against Stevenson. We are not persuaded for several 
reasons. First, at least two co-defendants pleaded guilty and 
agreed to testify against Stevenson well before the speedy 
trial clock expired. Second, there is no evidence of record that 
                                                                                                     
phrase ‘among others’ in § 3162(a)(2) refers to, and (2) that 
that factor is not necessarily determinative [are] so utterly 
clear from the text of the legislation that there is no 
justification for resort to the legislative history”). Courts have 
widely recognized, however, that this technically distinct 
factor often fits quite naturally into assessments of the third 
express factor. See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 
309 (7th Cir. 2010) (“That the court should consider whether 
the defendant has been prejudiced is implicit in th[e] broadly 
stated formula [of § 3162(a)(2)].”); United States v. Godoy, 
821 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The third factor 
makes clear the flexible, balancing approach required under 
§ 3162(a)(1). In addition, it provides authority for considering 
such aggravating and mitigating factors as the length of the 
delay and the prejudice to the defendant.”); Campbell v. 
United States, 364 F.3d 727, 731 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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the Government delayed the prosecution to facilitate turning 
witnesses against Stevenson. Third, Stevenson has not shown 
that the Speedy Trial Act violation undermined his “ability to 
prepare for trial.” United States v. Hernandez, 863 F.2d 239, 
244 (2d Cir. 1988). Nor is there any indication that the delay 
impaired Stevenson’s ability to mount an effective defense; 
for instance, no witnesses or evidence became unavailable as 
a result of the delay. Campbell v. United States, 364 F.3d 727, 
731 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 
1087, 1094 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he defendant has a burden 
under the [Speedy Trial] Act to show specific prejudice.”) 
(emphasis added). Because its conduct was unintentional, 
“penalizing the government for the delay [would not 
appreciably] deter any similar behavior in the future.” United 
States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 463 (10th Cir. 2006). 
And although the delay at issue was significant, Stevenson’s 
crimes were very serious and the “administration of justice 
would be harmed if reprosecution were barred.” United States 
v. Hamell, 3 F.3d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1993); see also United 
States v. May, 819 F.2d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 1987) (“When the 
charges are serious, courts should impose the sanction of 
dismissal with prejudice only for a correspondingly serious 
delay, especially in the absence of a showing of prejudice.”).9 
                                              
 9 Notwithstanding the seriousness of his charges, 
Stevenson claims the District Court failed to weigh the 
gravity of his crimes against the length of the Government’s 
delay. But the extent of a Speedy Trial Act violation has no 
bearing on the seriousness of the underlying charges against a 
defendant. Moreover, the Court properly factored the length 
and nature of the delay into its assessment of the facts and 
circumstances that led to dismissal and the lack of prejudice 
to Stevenson.  
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Moreover, the mere fact that the Government’s case against 
Stevenson “may get stronger with time is not sufficient to 
support [his] position that his speedy trial right was violated” 
absent evidence of prejudice suffered because of the delay.  
United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 91 (1st Cir. 2001). For 
these reasons, the District Court did not err in determining 
that the final statutory factor also weighed in favor of 
dismissal without prejudice.  
* * * 
 “Dismissal without prejudice is not a toothless 
sanction: it forces the Government to obtain a new indictment 
if it decides to reprosecute, and it exposes the prosecution to 
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.” Taylor, 487 U.S. 
at 342. The Government paid a price for its delay and has had 
to expend resources on appeal as a consequence. And while a 
zero-tolerance policy for Speedy Trial Act violations 
probably would reduce the incidence of such violations, “[i]f 
the greater deterrent effect of barring reprosecution could 
alone support a decision to dismiss with prejudice, the 
consideration of the other factors identified in § 3162(a)(2) 
would be superfluous, and all violations would warrant 
barring reprosecution.” Id. There are cases in which the 
Speedy Trial Act violation is so substantial, the motive so 
inappropriate, or the resultant prejudice so great that it would 
be an abuse of discretion for a district court to fail to dismiss 
an indictment with prejudice. This case is not one of them.  
B 
 Stevenson next challenges his conviction for fraud in 
relation to identification documents on several grounds. First, 
he claims the third superseding indictment did not include a 
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“plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential 
facts constituting the offense charged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 
7(c)(1). This requirement is rooted in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments of the Constitution. The former requires grand-
jury indictment for “infamous crime[s],” U.S. Const. amend. 
V, and the latter insists upon notice to the defendant of the 
“nature and cause of the accusation,” U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
Pursuant to these guarantees, the Supreme Court has 
instructed that an indictment must contain all the elements of 
the charged offense to ensure that a grand jury found them 
present and to “fairly inform[] a defendant of the charge 
against which he must defend,” as well as “enable[] him to 
plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions 
for the same offense.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 
117 (1974); see also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 
768–70 (1962). In other words, “an indictment is facially 
sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the offense 
intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant 
of what he must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the 
defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he may plead 
a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent 
prosecution.” United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is well 
established that “a defendant may contend that an indictment 
is insufficient on the basis that it does not satisfy the first 
requirement in that it fails to charge an essential element of 
the crime.” United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is Stevenson’s 
contention here. 
 The third superseding indictment charged Stevenson 
with fraud in relation to identification documents under 18 
U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7). Section 1028 has a somewhat disjointed 
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structure: subsection (a)(7) makes it illegal to “knowingly 
transfer[], possess[], or use[], without lawful authority, a 
means of identification of another person” in furtherance of or 
in connection with a crime, and then subsection (c)(3) also 
requires that “the production, transfer, possession, or use 
prohibited by this section is in or affects interstate or foreign 
commerce.”10 Because the statute does not make Stevenson’s 
conduct illegal absent this latter requirement, the interstate 
commerce proviso is an essential element of the offense. See, 
e.g., United States v. Spears, 697 F.3d 592, 601 (7th Cir. 
2012), overturned in part on other grounds, United States v. 
Spears, 729 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 The rules governing how a charge must be set forth in 
an indictment are not exacting. Indeed, they “were designed 
to eliminate technicalities in criminal pleadings and are to be 
construed to secure simplicity in procedure.” United States v. 
Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). “[N]o greater specificity 
than the statutory language is required so long as there is 
sufficient factual orientation to permit a defendant to prepare 
his defense and invoke double jeopardy.” Huet, 665 F.3d at 
595 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, an 
indictment will satisfy these requirements where it informs 
the defendant of the statute he is charged with violating, lists 
the elements of a violation under the statute, and specifies the 
time period during which the violations occurred.” Id.; see 
also United States v. Troy, 618 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(“An indictment that tracks the language of the underlying 
statute generally suffices to meet this standard; provided, 
                                              
 10 Subsection (c) lists alternatives to this interstate 
commerce requirement but none apply. 
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however, that the excerpted statutory language sets out all of 
the elements of the offense without material uncertainty.”). 
Moreover, we have eschewed any approach that insists upon 
magic words that perfectly mirror the statutory language of 
the charged offense: “[f]ailure to allege the statutory elements 
will not be fatal provided that alternative language is used or 
that the essential elements are charged in the indictment by 
necessary implication.” Gov’t of V.I. v. Moolenaar, 133 F.3d 
246, 249 (3d Cir. 1998).  
1 
 Although it presents a close case, Stevenson’s charge 
of fraud in relation to identification documents adequately 
stated the essential elements of the offense. The indictment 
charged that Stevenson: 
did knowingly possess, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another 
person with the intent to commit, or to aid or 
abet, or in connection with, any unlawful 
activity that constitutes a violation of Federal 
law, or that constitutes a felony under any 
applicable State or local law, to wit: the 
defendant possessed a fraudulent Georgia 
Driver’s License bearing his photograph but in 
the name of M.G.H. with the intent to aid in the 
commission of possession with intent to 
distribute a controlled substance and unlawful 
possession of a stolen firearm.  
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App. 262. Conspicuously absent from this language is a 
specific averment regarding the interstate commerce element 
of § 1028. Nevertheless, the District Court denied 
Stevenson’s motion to dismiss because the count mentioned 
Stevenson’s drug and firearm offenses, which expressly 
“rel[ied] on allegations of actions in or affecting interstate 
commerce.” App. 50. “By alleging that the identification 
documents were used to facilitate these activities,” the Court 
reasoned, the fraud count “adequately states one of the 
necessary elements of subsection (c), namely that the 
‘possession . . . prohibited by this section is in or affects 
interstate or foreign commerce.’” App. 50–51 (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 1028(c)(3)(A)). Although we agree with the Court’s 
ultimate conclusion, this line of reasoning is problematic.  
 It is true that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
allow “[a] count [to] incorporate by reference an allegation 
made in another count.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). But “any 
such incorporation must be expressly done.” United States v. 
Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 952 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding a count 
defective where “the count that charged [the defendant] with 
possession of a firearm in a school zone, did not expressly 
refer to the interstate commerce nexus alleged” in a separate 
count); see also United States v. Knox Coal Co., 347 F.2d 33, 
38 (3d Cir. 1965) (“[U]nless the charging part of a conspiracy 
count specifically refers to or incorporates by reference 
allegations which appear under the heading of the overt acts, 
resort to those allegations may not be had to supply the 
insufficiency in the charging language itself.”); United States 
v. Fulcher, 626 F.2d 985, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Each count 
in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment. 
Each count must stand on its own, and cannot depend for its 
validity on the allegations of any other count not specifically 
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incorporated.”); 11A Cyc. of Federal Proc. § 42:105 (3d ed.) 
(“[A]n incorporation by reference must be clear, full, and 
definite and must be expressly done. In addition, the matter 
incorporated by reference is limited to what is embraced 
within the reference clause.”). 
 Here, the indictment’s reference to the drug and 
firearm charges against Stevenson is insufficiently specific to 
incorporate the interstate commerce element into the fraud 
count. Indeed, we rejected a similar incorporation theory in 
United States v. Spinner. Spinner was charged with access 
device fraud in count one of an indictment and with bank 
fraud in count two. 180 F.3d 514, 515 (3d Cir. 1999). Both 
offenses included an interstate commerce element, but the 
government failed to allege that element in the first count. Id. 
We rejected the argument that count one could absorb the 
element from count two by intra-indictment osmosis, holding 
that the indictment’s failure to allege all the elements of bank 
fraud required reversal of Spinner’s access-device fraud 
conviction. Id. at 516. Accordingly, the District Court erred to 
the extent that it merely relied on the fact that other charges in 
the indictment require a nexus to interstate commerce to 
satisfy the independent requirement that the false 
identification charge allege such a connection. 
 Nevertheless, we read the indictment here to include 
the interstate commerce element of § 1028. The false 
identification count’s reference to Stevenson’s use of a 
Georgia identification document in Pennsylvania with the 
intent to further drug and firearm offenses alleges an effect on 
interstate commerce by “necessary implication.” Moolenaar, 
133 F.3d at 249; see also United States v. Harms, 442 F.3d 
367, 372 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining that so long as an 
indictment as a whole “fairly imports” an element, “an exact 
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recitation of [that] element . . . is not required”). Inherent in 
the indictment’s description of Stevenson’s actions is 
interstate commercial activity: the use of a fake Georgia 
drivers’ license in Pennsylvania to further drug and firearm 
crimes. For this reason, we hold that the false identification 
count sufficiently communicated the interstate commerce 
element to the grand jury and informed Stevenson of the 
nature of the charges against him.  
2 
 Even had the indictment failed to allege the interstate 
commerce element of the false identification offense, the 
error would have been harmless. Although we previously 
characterized a similar omission as a “fundamental defect” in 
an indictment that deprived us of jurisdiction and was not 
susceptible to harmless error review, Spinner, 180 F.3d at 
516, that view is no longer valid. As we shall explain, an 
indictment that fails to include all essential elements of the 
charged offense is subject to harmless error review when the 
issue was raised in the trial court. 
 Our opinion that defective indictments required 
automatic reversal rested on two propositions: (1) that such 
defects are jurisdictional; and (2) that they constitute 
structural flaws not amenable to harmless error review. See 
id. at 515–16. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the first 
proposition in United States v. Cotton. Evaluating an 
indictment that failed to include an Apprendi sentencing 
factor—a flaw the Fourth Circuit had deemed jurisdictional—
the Court reversed, holding that “defects in an indictment do 
not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.” 535 
U.S. 625, 630 (2002).  
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 As for the second proposition, the fact that a defect in 
an indictment is not jurisdictional does not answer the 
question of how we should review timely challenges to an 
indictment’s sufficiency. See United States v. Prentiss, 256 
F.3d 971, 983 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc), overruled on other 
grounds as recognized by United States v. Sinks, 473 F.3d 
1315, 1321 (10th Cir. 2007). And the Supreme Court has 
reserved for later consideration the issue “whether the 
omission of an element of a criminal offense from a federal 
indictment can constitute harmless error.” United States v. 
Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 104 (2007). But the Court’s 
guidance in analogous circumstances leads us to conclude 
that harmless error review applies because defective 
indictments do not constitute “structural” error.  
 Structural error “deprive[s] defendants of ‘basic 
protections’ without which ‘a criminal trial cannot reliably 
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or 
innocence . . . and no criminal punishment may be regarded 
as fundamentally fair.’” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 
8–9 (1999) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 
(1986)). Such errors, which require automatic reversal, occur 
“only in a very limited class of cases.” Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997). Moreover, “if the defendant 
had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is 
a strong presumption that any other errors that may have 
occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.” Rose, 478 
U.S. at 579 (emphasis added). Stevenson cannot overcome 
that strong presumption in this case. 
 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Neder is essentially 
dispositive here. In Neder, the Court held that a trial court’s 
failure to instruct a petit jury on every element of the charged 
offense “does not necessarily render a criminal trial 
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fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining 
guilt or innocence” and is hence subject to harmless-error 
review. 527 U.S. at 9. That rule applies equally to the grand 
jury context because “a defendant’s right to have a petit jury 
find each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt is no less important than a defendant’s right to have 
each element of the same offense presented to the grand 
jury.” Prentiss, 256 F.3d at 984. Nothing in the Supreme 
Court’s precedents indicates otherwise. See, e.g, Cotton, 535 
U.S. at 634 (suggesting that the Fifth Amendment grand jury 
right and the Sixth Amendment petit jury right both serve 
“vital function[s]” and should be protected equally). To the 
contrary, the Court “has classified only two types of grand 
jury related errors as structural, both involving discrimination 
in the selection of grand jurors.” Prentiss, 256 F.3d at 983 
(citing cases). “Otherwise, the Court has ‘see[n] no reason not 
to apply [harmless error analysis] to error, defects, 
irregularities or variances occurring before a grand jury just 
as [it has] applied it to such error occurring in the criminal 
trial itself.” Id. at 983–84 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 
475 U.S. 66, 71–72 (1986) (some internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
  We recognize that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has persisted in the view that a defective indictment 
requires reversal. See United States v. Omer, 395 F.3d 1087, 
1088 (9th Cir. 2005). Six judges of that Court have disagreed 
with that decision, which may indicate that the rule is on 
shaky ground even in the lone circuit that still adheres to it. 
See United States v. Omer, 429 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Graber, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(opining that an “absolute rule” of “automatic reversal of any 
conviction in which the defendant timely, and correctly, 
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objected that an element of the crime was missing from the 
indictment . . . . makes no sense”). But irrespective of 
whether Judge Graber’s dissent from the denial of rehearing 
en banc portends a change of course by the Ninth Circuit, we 
agree with at least six United States Courts of Appeals that 
harmless error review applies when an indictment’s omission 
of an essential element is challenged in district court.11 See 
United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 304–06 (4th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Cor-Bon Custom Bullet Co., 287 F.3d 576, 
580 (6th Cir. 2002); Prentiss, 256 F.3d at 981; United States 
v. Corporan-Cuevas, 244 F.3d 199, 202 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 The test for harmless error is set forth in Rule 52(a) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: “[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights 
must be disregarded.” This requires us to determine whether 
“beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the error complained of did 
not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“An otherwise valid 
conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may 
confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). To do so 
we ask: “(1) whether the indictment provided [Stevenson] 
                                              
11 Because it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of defective indictments and jury instructions in 
Cotton and Neder, we are not bound by our decision in 
Spinner to the extent that it treated an indictment’s omission 
of an essential element as a jurisdictional defect and structural 
error. 
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sufficient notice of the crime with which he had been charged 
and (2) whether [Stevenson] was harmed by losing the right 
to have the public determine whether there existed probable 
cause to charge the missing element.” United States v. 
Dentler, 492 F.3d 306, 310–11 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
First, although the count at issue did not explicitly 
reference “interstate commerce,” it nevertheless provided 
more than adequate statutory and factual detail to provide 
Stevenson notice of the charge against which he was to 
defend. See United States v. Mallen, 843 F.2d 1096, 1103 (8th 
Cir. 1988). Nor has Stevenson made any claim to the 
contrary. 
 We also resolve the second question in the 
Government’s favor. To determine whether Stevenson was 
harmed by losing the right to have the grand jury make a 
probable cause determination regarding the interstate 
commerce element, we consider “whether, on the basis of the 
evidence that would have been available to the grand jury, 
any rational grand jury presented with a proper indictment 
would have charged that [Stevenson] committed the offense 
in question.” Dentler, 492 F.3d at 311. Considering the same 
evidence as that which was available to the grand jury, the 
petit jury found Stevenson guilty after receiving explicit 
instruction as to the facts necessary to convict Stevenson on 
the interstate commerce element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This verdict strongly supports the conclusion that a rational 
grand jury would have probable cause to charge Stevenson 
with each and every element of the fraudulent identification 
charge. See United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 289 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (noting that “the petit jury’s unanimous findings” 
are “at a minimum, persuasive evidence of how a grand jury 
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would find”). Indeed, especially in light of the expansive 
understanding of what constitutes “interstate commerce,” it is 
hard to fathom how any rational person could conclude that a 
defendant who used an out-of-state false identification in 
furtherance of an interstate drug operation had probably not 
done so “in or affect[ing] interstate . . . commerce.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028(c)(3)(a). Accordingly, to the extent that the indictment 
was deficient, Stevenson suffered no harm and the District 
Court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss that count 
of the indictment.  
C 
 We turn next to Stevenson’s Fourth Amendment 
claims. Stevenson filed a motion to suppress evidence 
acquired in the stop of his vehicle and the subsequent search 
of his residence. He claims that the stop was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion and that the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant for his residence failed to establish probable 
cause. We review the reasonable suspicion determination de 
novo, Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003), 
and the probable cause assessment for whether the 
“magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that the 
affidavit supporting the warrant established probable cause,” 
United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2011).  
1 
 It is well established that a law enforcement officer 
conducting a traffic stop “may, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the 
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 
(2000). The Supreme Court has not reduced “reasonable 
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suspicion” to a “neat set of legal rules,” preferring instead a 
“totality of the circumstances” approach focused on “whether 
the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis 
for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2002) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). “This process allows officers to draw on their own 
experience and specialized training to make inferences from 
and deductions about the cumulative information available to 
them that might well elude an untrained person.” Id. at 273 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Suspicion must be based 
on more than a “mere hunch” to be reasonable, but “the 
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level 
required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of 
satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 
274 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The record supports the District Court’s conclusion 
that there was reasonable suspicion to stop Stevenson’s 
vehicle. Prior to the stop, the authorities had identified Hood 
Promo as the hub of a heroin ring by conducting several 
controlled drug purchases there and by identifying several 
suspected members of the conspiracy, including a man going 
by the street name “Inf” or “Infinite.” Law enforcement had 
learned that “Inf” was a 5’6” black male in his late twenties 
and his real name was probably Terrell Stevenson. The agents 
also knew that “Inf”: drove a gray BMW, was reputed to be 
responsible for heroin distribution in the Wilkes-Barre area, 
and was a rapper in the group Currency Club. When those 
facts are considered in light of the fact that the State of New 
York had issued a warrant for Stevenson’s arrest, the agents 
were well justified in stopping the gray BMW to determine 
whether “Inf”/Stevenson was behind the wheel. See United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (noting that “the 
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whole picture” must be taken into account in determining 
reasonable suspicion and that “[t]he process does not deal 
with hard certainties, but with probabilities”). Thus, the 
District Court did not err when it denied Stevenson’s motion 
to suppress physical evidence and testimony relating to the 
stop of his vehicle and his use of false identification 
documents.  
2 
 Stevenson next claims that the affidavit of probable 
cause in support of the warrant to search his residence was 
insufficient. In reviewing this affidavit, our role “is simply to 
ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . 
conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.” Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). 
 The affidavit submitted by Special Agent Davis 
provided extensive information of drug activity at Hood 
Promo and sufficiently connected Stevenson to the illegal 
conduct. It detailed: physical surveillance observing 
Stevenson transporting unknown objects to and from Hood 
Promo; the fact that Stevenson was wanted in New York on 
drug-related charges; a reliable confidential source’s 
identification of Stevenson as a Hood Promo heroin dealer; 
and phone conversations and text messages between 
Stevenson, Thomas, and Bush that—while “cryptic and 
vague,” in the words of the District Court, App. 19—were 
suggestive of drug activity.  
 Stevenson claims most of this is “guilt by association,” 
and that the affidavit fails to adequately set forth the 
confidential informant’s basis of knowledge for his claim that 
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Stevenson was involved in the Hood Promo heroin trafficking 
scheme. Stevenson Br. 38. Although the informant’s basis of 
knowledge is cursory, the information provided was 
“corroborated through independent investigation” of Hood 
Promo, Thomas, Bush, Stevenson, and others. See, e.g., 
United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Because the totality of the circumstances described in the 
affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate to 
conclude that there was a “fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime” would be found at Stevenson’s 
residence, Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, the District Court did not 
err when it denied Stevenson’s suppression motion.  
D 
 Stevenson also claims he was deprived of a fair trial 
when the judge “vouched” for a Government witness. During 
the defense’s cross-examination of Government witness 
William Nelson (the ringleader of the Hood Promo heroin 
operation), the following exchange occurred: 
Q. . . . All right, now, let’s talk about your 
prior record. You have a felony conviction, 
right? 
A. Twenty-four years ago. Not admissible, 
and it can’t be charged to me and I can’t be 
given an enhancement. It was when I was 18 
years old. So that’s irrelevant, that’s a moot 
point right now, sir, why are you bringing that 
up? 
Q. Is that moot? 
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A. Yes, it is moot. 
 THE COURT: Stop. Mr. Nelson, take it 
down a notch. 
 THE WITNESS: I’m gonna take it 
down, but he’s trying to muddy  the water. 
I’m being honest here. 
 THE COURT: I know you are. But let 
him ask his question. 
App. 617–18. The defense did not object to the Court’s 
remark, so we review it only for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 52(b).  
 Considering the entire record in context, we conclude 
that the District Court did not vouch for Nelson. See United 
States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 1984) (“A 
potentially prejudicial comment cannot be evaluated in 
isolation, out of context.”). Faced with a witness’s rising 
temper under the heat of counsel’s attempt to impeach him 
with a decades-old conviction, the judge appropriately 
stepped in to cool passions. The judge’s pacifying response “I 
know you are” to Nelson’s flustered protestation that he was 
“being honest” and that defense counsel was trying to 
“muddy the water,” App. 618, “should not be literally 
interpreted to mean that [the judge] would . . . under any 
circumstances believe anything that [Nelson] said.” United 
States v. Twomey, 806 F.2d 1136, 1143 (1st Cir. 1986). In our 
view, no reasonable juror would have viewed the judge as 
actually vouching for the witness’s testimony. Although 
“[t]here is no bright line separating remarks that are 
appropriate from remarks that may unduly influence a jury,” 
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Olgin, 745 F.2d at 269, the context of the exchange in this 
case shows that the trial judge’s comment carried no improper 
sway. 
 The four-factor “sliding scale” test we articulated in 
Olgin to assess the propriety of a judge’s comments supports 
our conclusion. 745 F.2d at 268. First, the comment lacked 
“materiality” because the judge was not actually speaking to 
Nelson’s credibility or in any other way opining on matters 
“central to the defense.” Id. at 269 (citing United States v. 
Anton, 597 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1979) (reversible error 
where judge made “flat statement of disbelief of the 
testimony of the witness”)). Nor was the comment of an 
“emphatic or overbearing nature” such that the jury might 
accept it “as controlling”—it was casual and palliative more 
than anything else. United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186, 
189 (3d Cir. 1971). Third, if the comment had crossed the 
line, any error would have been ameliorated by the judge’s 
thorough instructions, which emphasized to the jury, inter 
alia, that it “should not take anything [the judge] may have 
said or done during the trial as indicating what [he] think[s] of 
the evidence or what [he] think[s] about what [the] verdict 
should be.” App. 1151; Olgin, 745 F.2d at 269. Finally, our 
review of the Court’s well crafted “jury instruction as a 
whole” confirms what common sense already suggests: the 
judge’s remark had no prejudicial effect on Stevenson. Olgin, 
745 F.2d at 269. 
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E 
 Stevenson’s final argument is that the sentence 
imposed by the District Court was procedurally 
unreasonable.12 We disagree. 
 Stevenson argues that the District Court committed 
procedural error by (1) treating the Guidelines as mandatory 
in contravention of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005); (2) failing to give meaningful consideration to the 
sentence disparities between Stevenson and his co-
defendants; and (3) failing to give meaningful consideration 
to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  
 His first point relies on the judge’s statement to 
Stevenson at sentencing that he had enough prior convictions 
to qualify as a career offender under the Guidelines and that 
this was “significant . . . because it changes the way the law 
looks at you and it changes the way the law looks at you in a 
manner that I, in turn, must abide by.” App. 1571. Stevenson 
quotes this statement for the proposition that the Court 
                                              
 12 We review Stevenson’s sentence under an abuse of 
discretion standard. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 
565 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). The party challenging the 
sentence bears the burden of proving its unreasonableness. 
United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2006). For 
its sentence to have been “procedurally” reasonable, the 
District Court must have correctly calculated the Guidelines 
range, given meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) 
factors, and adequately explained the chosen sentence. Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  
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mistakenly thought itself bound by the Guidelines. Once 
again, context proves otherwise.  
 “District Courts engage in a three step process when 
imposing a sentence,” the first being that “the defendant’s 
guideline range is calculated.”  United States v. Larkin, 629 
F.3d 177, 195 (3d Cir. 2010). This is the duty the judge was 
referring to, which he performed just sentences later, 
explaining: “that’s why you’re facing a total offense level 
here of 37 and a criminal history category of 6 because you 
are a Career Offender here.” App. 1571. The Court was 
required to make this determination before moving on to 
consider any departure motions (step two) and the § 3553(a) 
factors (step three), and thus committed no error. See Larkin, 
629 F.3d at 195. 
 Stevenson’s second procedural argument fares no 
better. The District Court thoughtfully considered 
Stevenson’s request for a downward departure from his high 
Guidelines range based on his co-defendants’ substantially 
lesser sentences and reasonably decided against it. In 
particular, the Court found the disparities understandable in 
light of the contrast between the co-defendants’ lower 
criminal history categories and acceptance of responsibility 
versus Stevenson’s career offender status, risk of recidivism, 
and pointed lack of remorse. This assessment provided more 
than sufficient consideration of Stevenson’s departure motion. 
Cf. United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 Finally, Stevenson’s contention that the District Court 
failed to give meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors is belied by the record. The only argument 
Stevenson has raised in this regard is that the District Court 
did not account for his “disadvantaged upbringing and lack of 
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guidance as a youth.” Stevenson Br. 52. In fact, the District 
Court gave careful consideration to Stevenson’s “difficult 
childhood” and reasonably concluded that a within-
Guidelines sentence was warranted in light of Stevenson’s 
life of crime. App. 1570–72. Because the record shows that 
the District Court meaningfully considered all relevant 
sentencing factors, we reject Stevenson’s contention that his 
sentence was unreasonable.  
III 
 All of the arrows in Stevenson’s appellate quiver miss 
the mark, though one grazes its target. The District Court did 
not err in dismissing the first superseding indictment without 
prejudice, in denying his motion to dismiss the false 
identification count of the indictment, in denying his 
suppression motions, in making a statement obviously geared 
toward pacifying an emotional witness at trial, or in 
sentencing Stevenson to 360 months’ imprisonment. 
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
